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ABSTRACT
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 has not only affected the way airlines
compete with each other, it has also changed the distribution channels that were
once rigidly controlled by the airlines, travel agents and Civil Aeronautics Board.
In recent years, the cost to airlines of having travel agents distribute their tickets
has increased significantly. Since a large portion of these costs stems from
airlines paying "overrides" to travel agents who exceed a baseline market share,
which has been set by airline management, the determination of a carrier's
market share in an originating city market can have serious profit implications.
The problem addrcsscd in this thesis is how an airline might predict *ts
share of the passenger market out of an originating city. In this thesis, six
different mathematical models, relating a carrier's market share to a set of
exogenous variables, are proposed. Using actual airline market share data, each
of these models is calibrated and tested in fifteen selected test markets and a
statistical determination of each model's accuracy is performed.
Of the six models tested, a non-linear multivariable regression model,
relating a carrier's market share to its: seat share; frequency share; proportion of
non-stop flights; and proportion of total destinations served, out of an originating
city, is preferred. The use of this market share model should help airlines predict
their share of the originating city passenger market, and thus, provide them with
a means of setting market share quotas based upon a known set of service
variables.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation for Thesis
1.1.1 Background
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) has not only affected the
way airlines compete with each other, it has also changed the distribution
channels that were once rigidly controlled by the airlines, travel agents, and
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Deregulation altered the rules of play among
these three groups. Prior to deregulation, both the airlines and the CAB were
responsible for accrediting travel agents, the only source of airline tickets
aside from the airlines. The CAB regulated fares for all interstate airlines and
set the commissions that airlines were to pay travel agents for the tickets they
issued.
"The role of travel agents in the distribution system was expected to
decline after deregulation as airlines experimented and ultimately adopted
methods of distribution not sanctioned by regulation."I Commissions and
commission rates were expected to decline as airlines decreased fares and
entry into the travel agency business became freer. Alternative distribution
channels were expected to alleviate the reliance of airlines and passengers on
the services of travel agents.
What has transpired since 1978, however, is the complete opposite of
what was expected. Deregulation has strengthened the role of the travel agent
in the distribution process, largely due to the proliferation of fares and their
frequent revisions by airlines. Not only have commission rates increased
since deregulation, but the development of "commission override programs"
has further increased the cost to airlines of travel agency services. 2  "Travel
agency commissions paid by U.S. major carriers on domestic flights increased
from $527 million in 1977 to slightly nmore than $3.1 billion in 1985."3
To understand the current relationship between airlines and travel
agents, and why it is costing airlines such a large sum of money to do business
with these travel agents, this chapter presents a brief history of how the
distribution channels evolved and a description of the current practices that
govern the distribution of airline tickets.
1.1.2 History - Development of Airline Distribution
Channels
In 1945, the Air Transport Association of America, comprised of the
major U.S. airlines, created the Air Traffic Conference (ATC) to deal with the
problems and dilemmas of distributing and marketing air transportation
services. Under agreements adopted by the member airlines, the ARC
established methods by and conditions under which accredited travel agents
could sell airline tickets. Regulations guiding the accreditation of travel
agents by airlines, including standards for business practices, financial
requirements, personnel training, and agency location, were also established
by the ATC. A key aspect of these agreements was the exclusiveness provision
that restricted the sale of airline tickets to accredited travel agents and to the
airlines themselves, agreements that the CAB exempted from U.S. antitrust
laws. The CAB also acted as a third party in determining the level of
commission rates payed by airlines to travel agents. Since commission rates
were a fixed percentage of ticket prices and the CAB regulated prices were a
function of length of haul, travel agents would earn more money on tickets
sold for long haul flights than on those sold for short haul flights. This rigidly
controlled system remained intact for 34 years with few changes made.
In September of 1979, one year after the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act, the CAB initiated an investigation into the competitive
marketing of air transportation services to determine if and how competition
could be introduced into the system. The investigative order charged that:
"...the means by which, and the locations from which, the
retailers may compete for sales with suppliers are limited, and
the classes of consumers with which the retailers may do
business are circumscribed. The result is little or no
competition on price at any level, and carefully controlled
competition between suppliers and retailers. Competition
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among retailers is largely confined to providing services,
which consumers may not want or need." 4
During the course of this investigation, the CAB voted in 1980 to
eliminate fixed industry-wide commissions paid to travel agents. This paved
the way for individual negotiations of commissions between carriers and
agents. Contrary to the CAB's expectation, however, the deregulation of sales
commissions led to an increase in the average commissions paid by the
airlines (8.3% in 1977 to 9.6% in 1985).
The rapid rise in commission rates was due to several factors. First, the
failure to deregulate distribution networks while allowing carriers to
negotiate their own commission levels led not only to an increase in the
commission r-tes, but also to an initiation of commission override programs.
Since travel agents were still the airlines' only source for distributing tickets
(by 1979 travel agents sold 53% of all airline tickets), providing monetary
incentives was a method of influencing their choice, and ultimately the
consumer's choice, when making a travel decision. In addition, carriers
without their own computer reservation systems (CRS) saw this as an
opportunity to alleviate some of the bias that favored the host CRS carrier.
Since the non-owning carriers were usually not given the best position in the
display, an additional payment ,to a travel agent might prompt her to search
for that carrier's particular flight.
A second reason for the increase in commission rates was the confusion
that existed in the marketplace as a result of deregulation. With many new
carriers entering the marketplace and with the development of additional
fares and fare classes, the carriers found it necessary to rely on an expert to
search for "the best deal." "...[T]he confused marketplace of deregulation
allowed for agents to sell information to customers. Deregulation increased
the value to consumers of having an expert search for them, since it was more
likely that a good agent could find a new airline service, or a fare that the
customer could not find herself." 5  Travel agents' share of the total domestic
and international air travel increased from 57 to 74 percent between 1978 and
1984, and in dollar volume, their sales increased from $10.8 billion to $24.5
billion. 6  Clearly, travel agents achieved a dominant role in the distribution of
airline services, one that enabled them to negotiate higher commission fees
from the airlines.
In 1982, the CAB, in its report entitled "Competitive Marketing
Investigation", ended the exclusiveness provision in the marketing of air
transportation services. This allowed carriers to develop and utilize other
forms of distribution networks during the two year phase out of the
exclusiveness provision. The report also provided easier entry into the travel
agency industry by requiring the ATC to liberalize the process of accrediting
new applicants, a process that had already been under way since 1979. But by
1984, the first year carriers were totally free to distribute tickets in any
manner, the more than 25,000 travel agents operating in the U.S. (up from
15,000 in 1978) were selling over 70% of all tickets. 7  Clearly, travel agents had
control of the airline industry distribution network and "... any carrier that
upsets its relationships with its travel agents, either by reducing commission
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rates or by establishing an alternate distribution channel, is vulnerable to
reduced travel agent bookings" 8 and ultimately reduced profits.
1.1.3 Current Practices in the Distribution of Airline
Tickets
The changes in the distribution channels that evolved after the passage
of the ADA in 1978 and the deregulation of travel agent services in 1982 are,
for the most part, still intact today. At this point in time, there has still been
no establishment of alternate distribution channels although some airlines
(World Airways, in particular) have experimented with selling tickets through
Ticketron. Some large corporations and other businesses have established
their own business travel departments or hosted in-house travel agencies
enabling them to deal directly with the airlines. In this manner, they have
been able to negotiate price discounts for advance purchases of block tickets
(especially on routes that are frequently traveled by executives). Aside from
these small changes, however, travel agents have remained in control of the
distribution channels, still selling over 70% of all airline tickets.
In the past few years, the merger of many travel agencies and the buy-
out of smaller agencies by larger ones have also served to strengthen the
control travel agents have over the distribution channels. Many of these new
"mega travel agencies" have been able to exert a significant amount of control
over the airlines they serve. Through these mergers, large travel agencies,
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with many offices throughout a city, have been able to capture a large
percentage of that city's originating air traffic. By obtaining large market
shares in originating cities, travel agencies are able to gain negotiating power
with the airlines they serve.
As an example of this power, Pan Am, in 1982, was encountering severe
financial difficulties and, as a result, made the decision to slash its
commissions and commission override programs in an effort to reduce its
operating costs. Although successful in reducing its costs, Pan Am also saw a
sudden drop in its advance bookings as a result of this action. Management at
Pan Am quickly realized the power of their travel agents and publicly stated
that "...[W]e have reinstated these bonuses and overrides emphasizing our
commitment to travel agents as our airline's primary 4;tribution channel." 9
United Airlines also proposed a new rate structure between carriers and
agents after the CAB deregulated commission payments in 1979. Since United's
routes were generally longer than those flown by their competitors, its
commissions per ticket tended to be higher than the industry average. United's
proposal of a fixed rate of $8.50 on all tickets was opposed so vigorously by the
travel agents that it never found its way into the marketplace.
As previously stated, the means by which most airlines compensate
travel agents for the sale of tickets is through both straight commissions and
commission override programs (also known as bonus incentives). Straight
commissions are simply payments based on a fixed percentage of the ticket
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price. For example, if the carrier-agent commission rate is 9 percent, and the
travel agent sells a ticket with a $400 fare, then the airline pays the agent $36.
Commission override programs are generally one of two types. The first type
of override program is "...usually in the form of additional payments from an
airline to a travel agency of up to 5 percent of the ticket price when agency
sales of that airline's tickets exceed a certain volume." 10 The second type of
override program involves an additional payment from an airline to a travel
agency, at a fixed percent of the ticket price, when the travel agency's market
share of that airline's ticket sales exceeds a certain percentage. For example,
carrier A may agree to pay Agent X an additional 5 percent of the total ticket
price on all tickets sold if 25 percent of Agent X's sales are for carrier A. Thus,
if 26 percent of Agent X's sales are for carrier A, then Agent X will receive an
additional 5 percent commission on the tickets sold for Carrier A.
1.1.4 Scope of the Problem
In 1985, the Air Traffic Conference estimated that 60 percent of all
domestic tickets and 80 percent of all international tickets sold through travel
agents benefited from some type of override program. In that year alone, total
ticket sales by travel agents amounted to more than $32 billion. 11 At a
minimum, if 60 percent of that total revenue received an average override
commission of 3 percent (a modest estimate), then airlines would have paid
travel agents more than $576 million in override commissions alone in that
15
year. This obviously represents a staggering loss in potential profits for the
airline.
How airlines structure these override programs can significantly affect
their profit potential. Whether the override program is based on a volume of
sales by the travel agent or a specific market share achieved by the agent, the
setting of a baseline goal that a travel agent attempts to meet is of critical
importance.
Determining a baseline level of sales or market share in an originating
city market can be a very difficult process in today's deregulated
environment. Frequent changes in scheduling, destinations served, and fares
can significantly alter an airline's share of the market in an originating city.
Seasonality in air transportation demand can also have an effect on an
airline's share of the market, especially if the carrier is strictly a North-South
or East-West carrier (e.g. Eastern Airlines or United Airlines).
The problem to be addressed in this thesis is how an airline might
predict its share of the market in an originating city and how it may
determine its relative market dominance in that city. Making a forecast based
upon some exogenous variables which are relevant to both the particular
airline and market would allow management to set baseline sales goals for
travel agencies based upon a known set of variables. Instead of designing
incentive programs based simply upon a travel agency's past performance
(prior month's sales), incentive targets could be based upon an expected level
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of service that an airline has committed to or to an expected future market
dominance condition.
1.2 Objective of Thesis
Market share modeling was an important aspect of airline management
in the previously regulated environment. With the number of competitors
and fare levels fixed by the CAB in each origin-destination (0-D) market,
competition between air carriers was most prevalent in the areas of flight
scheduling and passenger service. As a way of studying the competitive
behavior of airlines, market share models were developed mainly to determine
the relationship between flight scheduling and market share. Understanding
this relationship and the ability to predict the response of competitors to
frequency changes were fundamental to an airline's profitability.
Although these market share models were developed to study and
understand the competitive behavior of airlines in O-D markets (see Chapter
Two), these same models or similar models might be adapted for the analysis of
a carrier's market share or market dominance in an originating city. As
previously stated, an airline's ability/inability to predict the share of
originating passengers it can attract in a particular city can have a large
impact on its profit margins. In addition, information regarding a carrier's
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relative strength or dominance in a city can be used to set advertising budgets
and to establish travel agency commission levels. If a carrier has achieved a
dominant position in a city with few competitors, perhaps there is no need to
match the commissions that other carriers are paying.
The objective of this thesis is to apply previously developed market
share models and new derivatives of these models to originating city markets.
Using actual airline market share data, several of these models will be
calibrated and a statistical determination of the accuracy of each model will be
made. The results of these modeling efforts will also provide information as to
which variables are most important in predicting an airline's share of the
originating passengers in a city.
In today's unregulated environment, competition between carriers can
vary widely from city to city. Factors such as whether the city is used as a hub
by one or more airlines, the number of carriers operating out of the city, and
the size of the originating market (in terms of number of departures) can all
have an affect on the competition between air carriers. In determining
which models are the most accurate for predicting market share, a large cross-
section of cities will be analyzed so that the selected model will produce
satisfactory results in any type of originating market.
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1.3 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis will be presented in four chapters. The
second chapter of this thesis will present an overview of classical airline
market share models. This chapter will review the current literature on
market share-frequency share models and their relevance in a regulated
environment. The author will then show how these models may be applied in
a deregulated environment, specifically to an originating city market.
In Chapter Three of this thesis, the author will begin to apply both the
market share-frequency share model and the market share-seat sharz- model
in several originating city markets. As discussed in Chapter Two, both of these
models were very effective in predicting a carrier's market share in an
origin-destination (O-D) market. Before fitting these two models to the actual
market share-frequency share data, the author will present an overall
description of the data used in the analysis including both the limitations and
the accuracy of the data being used. Using simple recursive methods, these
two models will be applied to the data, and the exponents, which are unique to
each city, will be determined. Finally, an error analysis will be presented with
a discussion of the results.
In Chapter Four, the author will apply a simple non-linear market
share model, first presented by Bond [2], to the originating city markets
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analyzed in Chapter Three. Although this model was not extremely effective
in O-D markets, its use in an originating city market will prove to be of more
importance. A simple logarithmic transformation will be made so that this
model can be fit to the data using a linear regression technique. The author
will then add to Bond's model additional variables that may be used in
predicting a carrier's market share in an originating city market. Finally, an
error analysis will be presented and the accuracy of the models used in this
chapter will be discussed.
In the concluding chapter of this thesis (Chapter Five), the author will
summarize the results of the six models presented in Chapters Three and Four.
A comparison of the prediction accuracy of all six models and a determination
of which model offers the best results will then be made. The author will also
briefly discuss how these results may used in a practical way by airline
management. Finally, a discussion of additional areas of research, including
further extensions of the models presented for market share modeling, will be
included.
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1987, p. 414.
2 Commission overide programs usually involve a payment, from an airline to
a travel agency, of a certain percentage of the ticket price when an agencies'
sales of that airline's tickets exceed a certain volume or market share.
3 John Meyer and Clinton Oster, Deregulation and the Future of Intercity
Passenger Demand, (Cambridge, Ma.: The MIT Press, 1978) p. 125.
4 Meyer and Oster, p. 127
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7 Meyer and Oster, p. 127.
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CHAPTER 2
Classical Airline Market Share Models
2.1 Introduction
Competition between airlines under regulation was most intense in the
areas of flight scheduling and passenger service. With both fares and the
number of competitors in each market determined by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), and little variation in the equipment operated by the airlines,
mar' et share was determine, factors such as frequency of service, departur.
and arrival times, and the overall image of the carrier. Even service amenities
offered by the different airlines were similar. If one carrier upgraded its
passenger service in an origin-destination (O-D) market, it was usually matched
by the other carriers so that the final product offered was not highly
differentiated. 1
Competition was thus left to the area of flight scheduling. It was in
this arena "... where the competitive energies of the trunk carriers were
unleashed, and where the boom and bust cycles of airline profitability were
causally linked to the competitive environment." 2  Understanding the game
of flight scheduling and trying to predict the competitive behavior of
competing air carriers is what prompted airline management and academics
to develop airline market share models.
22
"A market share model shows the relationship between the share of
passenger traffic for an airline in a given competitive market and the factors
that describe the quality of service offered in the market by the carrier." 3
Early research in this area indicated that the most significant variable in
explaining a carrier's market share was its frequency share. It was a
common notion that he who flies the most seats gets the most passengers. It
was this notion that led to many of the over-capacity problems that plagued
the airline industry under regulation. When carrier A increased frequency
in a given market (attempting to increase its market share) carrier B would,
if equipment was available, match its competitor's move. If carrier B was able
to match, the end result would usually be lower load factors for both carriers
and increased costs per passenger mile.
The next section of this chapter will outline some of the previous
research that has been conducted in the area of market share modeling. As
stated previously, this area of research was particularly useful to airline
management in the era of regulation. As such, little, if any, new research
has evolved since 1978, the year the airline industry was deregulated. In
section three of this chapter, the author will discuss why and how these
models may still be used in a deregulated environment, particularly in
originating city markets. It is in this area that the author will attempt to
provide original ideas, since all previous work has focused on market share
modeling in origin-destination (0-D) markets.
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2. 2 An Overview of Past Research into Airline
Market Share Modeling
Prior to any analytical or statistical work, it was commonly perceived
by most airline managements that there was a linear relationship between
market share (MS) and frequency share (FS). In a market with two carriers,
one with a 60 percent frequency share and the other with a 40 percent
frequency share, it was generally assumed that their market shares would
also be split 60-40. Any deviations from this MS=FS relationship were assumed
to be caused by the existence of certain carrier attributes, not easily
measured, that made one airline more attractive than another.
Taneja [15] ncied that E Lhough the dominant var,.. - used to explain
market share was frequency share, the relationship was not linear. Using
data from the top 50 O-D U.S. domestic markets in 1966, he demonstrated the
existence of an S-shaped curve between market share and frequency share.
Using the example above, it was found that the carrier (in a two competitor
market) that offered 60 percent of the frequency share would obtain a
market share greater than 60 percent, and the carrier with a 40 percent
frequency share would obtain a market share of less than 40 percent. Thus, a
carrier with a greater share of frequency than its competitors should receive
a more than proportional share of the traffic.
Having noted this phenomenon, Taneja attempted to model this
relationship in various ways. Using the model,
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MS= Ax FS + Bx FS2 + Cx FS+ D (2.1)
where A,B,C, and D are constants determined from a multiple regression,
Taneja found that the only significant variables (using the 1966 top U.S. O-D
markets) were,
MS= Cx FS+ D (2.2)
However, this did not account for the S-shaped curve.
To account for the S-shaped curve, Taneja proposed additional models
which, along with the variable frequency share, also included the number of
competitors in the specific O-D markets. One of these models,
MS = FS" x N_c (2.3)
where Nc is the number of competitors and a and p are estimated parameters,
accounted for the S-shaped relation in his selected data; however, the
accuracy of the results (pred.icted market share compared to actual market
share) was not overwhelming. Additionally, the coefficients a and p were
neither market dependent nor carrier dependent.
Bond's [2] proposed market share-frequency share model,
PAS= a x FS (2.4)
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where ai and pi are constants for carrier i, postulated that the market
frequency relationship is carrier dependent rather than route dependent.
These carrier dependent parameters were "... functions of the measurable
attributes of the carrier's defined product policy and the attributes of the
product as perceived by the air traveler." 4
Bond calibrated the model for the top U.S. domestic trunk carriers
using market share and frequency share data for the first quarter of 1968 in
the top 50 O-D markets. Although this model did not fully account for the
S-shaped phenomenon noted by Taneja and others, the model did highlight
the importance of perceptions that the traveling public held for each air
carrier. These perceptions or image factors, Bond hypothesized, contribute to
the determination of a carrier's market position.
Research by Simpson [12] also confirmed that market share is an
S-shaped function of frequency share with frequency being the dominant
explanatory variable. Except for station activity (the number of departures
out of the origin city), he found very little correlation with any other
variables. He did note, like Taneja, that the number of competitors in a
market affects the structure of the S-shaped market share curve.
Simpson proposed that for airline i competing with competitors j,k,...
a
MS, (FS,~
MS. FSIj FS (2.5)
where MSi equals the market share of passengers for airline i and FSi equals
the frequency share of departures for airline i, and a is determined by
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regressing data points covering a sample of n-competitor markets. For
airline i competing with n carriers in a market, Equation 2.5 reduced to
I 
FS
=1 . (2.6)
This new model produced a family of curves for n=2,3,4,... competitor markets
as shown in Figure 2.1. In developing these curves, it was assumed that if
carrier i is faced with three competitors (n=4), for example, each will split the
remaining frequency evenly. If, in fact, one of the three competitors had a
very low frequency share, the model would reduce to the n-1 curve. Thus the
model would produce points in the areas bounded by the curves. Note also
that each curve in the family crosses the raain diagonal at a point 1/n, which
is the case of all competitors having equal frequencies.
Using market share data for 1966 and 1967 in the largest U.S. O-D
markets, Simpson estimated the coefficient a in Equation 2.6 and determined
that a value of a=1.45 produced the best fit. Though the exponent a was
neither carrier dependent nor market dependent, Simpson did note that the
standard error in the model left room for additional explanatory variables
such as a carrier's station activity in the originating market or a carrier's
local image and advertising effort.
In his Master's Thesis "Competition in Air Transportation, An
Economic Approach", Renard [10] presented five different formulations of
Equation 2.6 involving variations of the coefficients according to either the
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FIGURE 2.1
Classical Market Share vs. Frequency Share Curves
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number of competitors in the market or to the airline's identity or to both
simultaneously. Like Simpson, Renard's first formulation with this model
assumed that a was simply a constant, neither carrier nor market dependent.
The results obtained with this formulation were identical to Simpson's.
Renard's second formulation of the model in Equation 2.6 assumed that
the exponent a depended upon the number of competitors in the market.
Using linear regression techniques, Renard determined a best a for the
markets with two to six competitors. Although there was no correlation
between the value of a and the number of competitors, n, the results of his
regression analysis did indicate that by breaking up the markets according to
the n competitor status, a better model could be fit to the data.
The next formulation of the mod!el in Equation ".6 that Renaid
examined assumed that a depended on the specific airline. Thus Equation 2.6
became:
FS'
I FS
j=1 (2.7)
where aj was a different index for each airline. Renard estimated the value
of this coefficient for the top U.S. trunk carriers in various O-D markets.
Having found values of a ranging from .30 to 1.0, he noted that an a close to
1.0 in this S-shaped model corresponded to an airline's ability to achieve a
proportionate share of the market. He also noted that there was not a strong
relationship between a carrier's profitability and its competitive position as
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determined by a (i.e. a large value of a did not correspond to large profits
earned by the carrier.).
Combining methods two and three above, Renard conducted an
analysis assuming that the coefficient a varied with both the carrier and the
number of competitors. For each of the U.S. trunk airlines, Renard produced
a matrix of exponents for each of the carriers in the n-competitor markets (n
equals 2 through 6) in which that carrier operated. Although this
formulation produced results with the lowest residual error of all methods
considered, there was no clear relationship between the carrier's competitive
position, a, and the size of the market in which it operated. The results did,
however, lead Renard to conclude that a carrier's unmeasurable attributes
played a significant role in its ability to capture a proportionate share of the
tr. in a market. This conclusion led to his proposai o "a multiple 2,
single a market share model."
Renard's multiple K single a market share model allowed for
differences in attractiveness between airlines by the inclusion of
multiplicative coefficients in Equation 2.6. The model then became:
K x FS"
K. x FS"
I =1 (2.8)
where the Kj represented the level of attractiveness for each carrier.
Calibrating this model, using the identical data bases analyzed in the previous
formulations, Renard determined K factors for each of the trunk carriers and
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a single a covering any n-competitor market. The results produced by this
formulation led Renard to conclude that this type of model, which includes a
multiplicative coefficient representing the attractiveness of each carrier,
best represents the share of the market obtained by an airline in a regulated
environment.
Further research by Simpson [13] led to a new model that further
quantified Renard's idea of carrier attractiveness. In this new model,
Simpson introduced the idea of image factor, both on a global basis and on a
local market basis. This new model became:
I.x FS"
/x FSc
1= F(2.9)
where Ii represents the system wide image factor for each airline, and Ai
represents the local image correction in the market.
The addition of the local image correction factor in the market was a
way of further quantifying the residuals that were present in Renard's
model. This local image factor was used to account for the differences in, for
example, the amount of advertising by a carrier in one market versus
another market. Simpson also found that the statistic "seat share," a carrier's
share of the total seats offered in a market, was statistically equivalent to
frequency share in the domestic markets. This notion of seat share is an
important statistic that will be used in market share models for originating
city markets, models which will be presented in Chapters Three and Four.
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The market share models proposed by Taneja, Bond, Renard, and
Simpson summarize the past research conducted in this area. However, since
the advent of deregulation, little, if any, new research has appeared in the
literature. In a regulated environment, airline market share modeling
between an origin and destination city was a much simpler task. With both
passenger fares and the number of competitors in a market fixed by the CAB,
an airline's market share was dependent on only a few variables, as the above
research has indicated. Now, however, the playing field is much more
complicated. Airlines are free to determine their own fares and choose the
markets in which they will operate, factors that would indeed complicate the
modeling process. More importantly, the idea of a market share model in an
origin-destination city pair has been complicated by the development of
connec ing hubs throughout the ted States. A carrier's share of [he
market from Boston to Los Angeles, for example, is not only influenced by the
number of competitors operating this route directly, but it is also influenced
by the number of carriers offering one-stop or connecting service (through
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, or Memphis) or even two-stop service. It is these
factors that would make market share modeling in specific O-D markets very
difficult today.
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2.3 Applications of Market Share Models in
Originating City Markets
As stated in Section 2.2, the intent of market share modeling is to
describe the factors that determine an airline's ability to attract passengers
in a given competitive market. Although the past research into market share
modeling has involved only origin-destination (or city pair) markets, there is
no reason why these same models, or similar ones, cannot be applied to
originating city markets. Since a market is simply an environment in which
two or more parties conduct business, the exact nature of that market is of
little importance when trying to model that relationship mathematically.
Under regulation, the need for market share modeling in an
originating city did not really exist. This is most likely why modeling efforts
were not applied to these markets. The liberalization of the airline-travel
agency relationship today, however, has resulted in the need for an airline to
predict its share of the market in an originating city.
Factors described by Taneja, Bond, Simpson, and Renard will also be
applicable in describing a carrier's market share in an originating city
market. Obviously, the number of seats offered by a carrier, the frequency of
flights, and the number of carriers operating out of a particular city will all
influence a carrier's market share in this type of market. Other factors such
as the number of non-stop markets served and total number of markets
served out of a particular city will influence a carrier's share of the market.
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Because many of the factors that influence a carrier's market share
in an O-D market also influence a carrier's market share in an originating
city, models identified in Section 2.2 may be applicable to this research. As
such, the use of these models, along with variations of them, will be explored
in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. Through this analysis, factors that
influence a carrier's share of the passengers in an originating city market
will be identified.
1 Origin-Destination (0-D) markets refer to the demand and supply of air
transportation between two cities X and Y, where city X represents the origin
of that demand and supply and city Y represents the destination of that
demand and supply.
2 William E. Fruhan, The Fight for Competitive Advantage: A Study of the U.S.
Domestic Trunk Carriers. (Boston, Ma: Division of Research, Harvard Business
School, 1972), Part III, p. 1.
3 Nawal K. Taneja, The Commercial Airline Industry, (Lexington, Ma. D.C.
Heath and Company, 1976), p. 143,
4 Richard 0. Bond, Frequency Competition on Domestic Air Routes. Master of
Science Thesis, MIT Sloan School of Business, 1970, p. 70.
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CHAPTER 3
Application of Classical Market Share
Models in Originating City Markets
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter Two, several different types of market share models were
presented. Broadly speaking, all of these models can be grouped into two
categories: those that can be calibrated using linear regression techniques
and those that cannot be calibrated using these techniques. Analysis of the
equations presented in the previous chapter reveals that Equations 2.1
through 2.4 can be solved by regression techniques, and that Equations 2.5
through 2.9 require some other approach. These latter models (2.5-2.9), which
Renard referred to as interactive market share models, will be the focus of this
chapter. 1
Although the phrase "originating city market" has been used
extensively up to this point, it would be helpful, before proceeding with any
model calibrations, to explicitly define its meaning in the context of the
airline industry. An originating city market is a market "... which contains all
the residences and business locations for consumers" 2 who have a demand for
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scheduled air transportation service. For example, the originating city market
in Boston refers to all consumers who choose to depart out of Logan Airport.
There might be some consumers in the metropolitan Boston area, however,
who choose to depart out of Bradley Field in Hartford. Thus, originating city
markets do not necessarily refer to all consumers who reside within a certain
geographic area (or live within a fixed radius of the airport), rather, it refers
to a group of consumers who choose to depart out of that city's airport. How
airlines share this group of consumers is the topic addressed in Chapters Three
and Four.
In the previous chapter, several different classical airline market share
models were presented. These models were applied strictly to origin-
destination markets (0-D) and have never been tested in originating city
m irkets. The purpose of this chapter is to calibrate two of these models in
originating city markets. These models, which have essentially the same
formulation but contain different independent variables, are:
FSa
ES
=1 (3.1)
and
SS"
j =1 (3.2)
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where,
M S i = market share of carrier i
F S i = frequency share of carrier i = total # of departures carrier i
total # of departures all carriers
SSi=seat share of carrier i = total # of seats offered by carrier i
total # of seats offered by all carriers
a = fitted exponent of frequency share or seat share
j = indices representing single airline operating in the market
n = total number of airlines in the market.
Given market share and frequency share data (or seat share data) for carrier i
as well as frequency share data for all other carriers in the particular market,
the objective of this analysis is to determine a value of a such that the mean
residual squared error (defined in Section 3.3) between actual and predicted
market share is minimized. A prediction of carrier i's market share will be
made by choosing a value of a in Equations 3.1 and 3.2 once the frequency
shares and seat shares have been determined for all carriers in the market.
The models presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2 were developed by
Simpson and, as discussed in Chapter Two, explained the variation in market
share in O-D markets. Simpson also found that in these O-D markets, seat
share was statistically equivalent to frequency share (i.e., the models in
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 produced similar results). Since the structure of O-D
markets and originating city markets are vastly different, these same models
will need to be applied in originating city markets to determine if: (1) this
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general model is useful in explaining the variation in market share in
originating city markets and (2) the two models are statistically equivalent.
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into four sections. In Section
3.2, a description of the data used in this analysis (and that used in the analysis
presented in Chapter Four) will be presented. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the
results of the model calibrations using Equations 3.1 and 3.2 will be presented.
Finally, Section 3.5 will compare the accuracy of the two models and discuss
the results presented.
3.2 Description of Data Used in Model Calibrations
To calibrate the models presented in Equations 3.1 and 3.2, three
different types of data were required: market share data, frequency share data,
and seat share data. For a more meaningful analysis, it was also required that
some minimum number of observations be obtained for each variable.
Obviously, large numbers of past observations will increase the confidence in
the prediction of a, which is important if the results of the calibration are to
be used for forecasting future market share. However, observations obtained
over too large a period of time could lead to a distorted prediction of a,
especially if there are large variations in the data. Since carriers can
significantly alter their quality of service in a short period of time, it is
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important that the past observations reflect the carriers' current quality of
service in that market. This is especially true if these calibrated models are to
be used for forecasting market share.
The data used in this analysis was provided by Northwest Airlines.
Market share, frequency share, and seat share data was obtained for fifteen
different cities in which Northwest operated passenger flights over a twenty-
one month sanple period. The next three subsections define exactly what the
data encompasses as well as the sources of information used by Northwest to
collect the observations.
3.2.1 Market Share Data
The market share data compares travel agencies' plated sales for
Northwest with the the total plated sales for all carriers operating in the
originating city markets, as provided by the Airline Reporting Corporation
(A R C). 3  The ARC is a clearinghouse used by most airlines to handle the
transfer of funds between travel agents and airlines, and between the air
carriers themselves. In defining which travel agencies fall into which
markets, Northwest groups agencies by zip codes. Agencies who share the
first three digits of the five digit zip code are all grouped into one market. In
cities such as Boston the market is comprised of over 1000 agencies, while in
smaller cites such as Saginaw the market is made up of only 50 agencies.
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Although there are various methods for measuring a carrier's market
share, this method, based on travel agency sales, was selected for a two
reasons. First, it is data readily available from the ARC and represents one of
the few methods for measuring a market's total size (using total plated sales).
Calculating market share based upon the total number of originating
passengers in a market might appear to be a better statistic, however, such a
statistic is not universally collected and reported. The second reason for
collecting market share in terms of travel agency sales was provided in
Chapter One. Since one of the uses of these market share models would be to
establish travel agency sales goals, it is only logical to calibrate the model
based upon the past performance of travel agencies as measured in terms of
ticket sales.
3.2.2 Frequency Share and Seat Share Data
The frequency share and seat share data provided by Northwest were
obtained from monthly reports published by the Official Airline Guide (OAG).
For each originating market selected, the total number of average daily flights
and the number of average daily seats were provided for each carrier in the
market. Averages were based on weekdays only (Monday through Friday).
Frequency shares and seat shares were easily obtained from:
FS i = total # of departures carrier i
total # of departures all carriers
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and,
SSi = total # of seats offered by carrier i
total # of seats offered by all carriers
3.2.3 Selected Test Cities
Fifteen originating city markets were selected as test cases for the
calibration of the models in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. These fifteen selected cities
represent a cross-section of markets in which Northwest operates domestic
passenger flights. Although there are many ways of grouping or classifying
the fifteen cities selected, Table 3.1, below, categorizes these cities based upon
Northwest's average market share (MS) over the twenty-one months for
which data was a, >le.
Category A
(MS< 10%)
Cit
Los Angeles
Orlando
Chicago
Rochester
St.Louis
Boston
Seattle
Category B
(10%<MS<40%)
Avg
City MS(%)
Huntsville 24.40
Omaha 14.30
Milwaukee 34.95
Madison 36.04
Avg
4.23
3.59
5.34
5.66
5.68
7.53
9.53
Category C
(MS>40%)
Detroit
Saginaw
Memphis
Minneapolis
Table 3.1: Selected Test Cities
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Avg
MS(%)
45.66
48.10
44.64
36.04
Notice that category C contains the three connecting hubs that Northwest
Airlines currently operates, each of which has more than 200 daily Northwest
departures. Smaller cities, such as Saginaw and Rochester, average less than
ten departures a day. While the groupings of cities are not of the utmost
importance, what should be noticed is the wide variation in Northwest's
market share for the selected cities. How the models perform in this diverse
cross-section of cities will be the true test of their adequacy.
3. 3 Calibration of the MS-FS Model
In Chapter Two it was noted that the relationship between market share
and frequency share in most of the origin-destination (0-D) markets analyzed
was S-shaped. That is, a carrier with a greater frequency share received a
more than proportional share of the market. The theoretical market share
model:
FS"
>ZFS
1=1 (3.1)
first presented by Simpson, which was used to generate Figure 2.1, accounted
for this S-shaped relationship.
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It would seem reasonable to check whether this assumption of an
S-shaped relationship exists in originating city markets before applying this
model to the fifteen selected cities. Clearly, if no such relationship exists then
the model given in Equation 3.1 will not be adequate. However, to construct
such a figure, the market share and frequency share for all of the n
competitors in a given market would have to be known. Unfortunately,
market share data like the type obtained from Northwest Airlines (data
described in Section 3.2.3) is not made available by the different air carriers.
Some generalizations can be made, however, by examining the
relationship between market share and frequency share for carrier i
(Northwest). Figures 3.1 through 3.15 show this relationship in each city for
the twenty-one months of data available. The fvures for the three hub cities;
Detroit, Memphis, and Minneapolis, show frequency shares that are 10 to 40%
higher than the corresponding market shares. These figures also do not
indicate positive linear correlation between the two variables, as one might
expect, but such observations can be characteristic of an airline's hub
operations. Although a carrier can be expected to dominate operations
(frequency) in a hub city, it usually will not be able to match this frequency
share with corresponding market share. This is simply due to the fact that
many passengers departing out of a hub do not originate in the hub city and
are therefore, not part of the measured market share, at least as market share
is measured in this analysis.
43
FIGURE 3.1
MS VS. FS IN BOSTON
10.0-
9.5-
9.0-
8.5-
8.0-
7.5-
7.0-
6.5-
6.0-
5.5-
5.0 1
2.0 3.0 3.5 4.0
FREQUENCY SHARE
FIGURE 3.2
MS VS. FS IN CHICAGO
2.5 3.0
FREQUENCY SHAF
44
x
x
x x
xx
Xx x
X X
x
x
x
i iX
2.5 4.5 5.0
6.5-
6.0 -
5.5 -
5.0 -
4.5-
x
x
x
x
x
X X
x
x
x X
2.0 3.5 4.0
FIGURE 3.3
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FIGURE 3.5
MS VS. FS IN LOS ANGELES
3.5-
-1X X
3.0 - . . . , . . . ,'-. . . .
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
FREQUENCY SHARE
FIGURE 3.6
2.2
MS VS. FS IN MADISON
FREQUENCY SHARE
46
40-
35 -
30-
x
x
X
xX xx
xxSN
x
x
x
FIGURE 3.7
MS VS. FS IN MEMPHIS
48-
46-
44-
42-
I 8 I
82 83 84 85 86 87
FREQUENCY SHARE
FIGURE 3.8
MS VS. dS IN MILWAUKEE
20 25 30 35 40 45 50
FREQUENCY SHARE
47
x
x x
x x VA
x x
x
x
FIGURE 3.9
MS VS. FS IN MINNEAPOLIS
72
70-
xx
K x x
68- x x x
Co x x
Ix x
66- X
64 x
62-
76 77 78 79 80
FREQUENCY SHARE
FI1URE 3.10
MS Vt.. FS IN OMAHA
19
x
17-
w
1-.. 15 - XX
2d x xx
13- x x
X
11 .
7 8 9 10 11 12
FREQUENCY SHARE
48
FIGURE 3.11
MS VS. FS IN ORLANDO
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FIGURE 3.13
MS VS. FS IN SAGINAW
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MS VS. FS IN SEATTLE
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FIGURE 3.15
MS VS. FS IN ST. LOUIS
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Different relationships between Northwest's market share (MS) and
frequency share (FS) can be observed in the figures for Huntsville, Madison,
Milwaukee, and Saginaw. In Huntsville, the market share is nearly double the
frequency share, yet Northwest's frequency share is rather low (<20%). The
MS-FS relationship shown in Saginaw indicates that higher frequency shares
corresponded to lower market shares, which is contrary to what would be
expected, and the figures for Madison and Milwaukee show almost no
correlation between MS and FS. The model given in Equation 3.1, which
assumes a positive correlation between MS and FS (for positive a), may not
perform well in these markets.
When estimating the model in Equation 3.1, a unique a can be
determined for each of the fifteen selected cities. The coefficient a is selected
such that the root mean square error (RMSE) between the actual and predicted
market share is minimized over the time for which data exists. The RMSE
between the actual and predicted market share is given by
I(MSP, - MSA,)
FMSE =1
M -i (3.3)
where MSPi is the predicted market share for carrier i, MSAi is the actual
market share for carrier i, and m is the number of months over which data is
available.
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Expanding Equation 3.1 to an n-competitor market,
SFS"
FS"+ FS2 +...+ FS (34)
a predicted market share for carrier i, MSPi, can be calculated by choosing
some a given the frequency shares of the n-competitors. The algorithm
presented below describes the procedure for selecting a:
1. Calculate the frequency shares for each of the n-competitors in the
selected market.
2. Initialize the exponent a (a>O), and calculate MSPi from Equation 3.3
over each of the k=1 to m months.
3. Given the acti il market share data for ca.ner i over each month,
MSAi, calculate the RMSE for the selected a from Equation 3.2.
To determine whether the a selected in Step 2 is the a that minimizes the RMSE,
another value of a must be selected and the process repeated. The process (an
iterative search process) of selecting an a and calculating a RMSE continues
until a minimum RMSE is found. This minimum is found only when
perturbating a by +x%, and -x% does not further decrease the value of the
RMSE.
There are several minimization or optimization techniques that are
available to carry out the above procedure; however, most of these techniques
require the use of a mainframe computer for which the computational costs
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can be high. Using a personal computer and a statistical spreadsheet-type
software package which allows for large quantities of data to be analyzed,
these same techniques can be carried out interactively in a short period of
time. 4 After selecting an initial value of a and then perturbating that value
in both the positive and negative directions an optimum value of a can be
found very quickly by comparing the RMSEs generated by each a.
Using the algorithm described above, a was determined for thirteen of
the fifteen selected cities. Table 3.2 lists the exponent a and the RMSE for each
of these cities. Also included in this table are the average predicted market
share, the average actual market share, and the standard deviation of the
actual market share for Northwest in each of the test markets.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 3.2. The first is that this
market share model does not perform well in cities where the market share far
exceeds the frequency share. Such was the case in Huntsville and Madison
where the value of the RMSE was so much larger than the standard deviation
of the actual market share, aMSA, that it was meaningless to report an
exponent a. The large values of the RMSE statistic indicate that the model did
not explain the variation in market share in these types of markets. In the
cities Saginaw, Milwaukee, Omaha, and Seattle, market shares were -5% higher
than the respective frequency shares in each case. Here again, the RMSE
statistic was significantly greater than aMSA, indicating that the model
performed poorly in these types of markets.
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CITY
BOSTON
CHICAGO
DETROIT
HUNTSVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MADISON
MEMPHIS
MILWAUKEE
LALA MINNEAPOLIS
OMAHA
ORLANDO
ROCHESTER
SAGINAW
SEA'ITLE
ST. LOUIS
PREDICTED
EXPONENT
.23
.48
.73
.30
.43
1.02
.86
1.10
.95
.74
1.05
.51
.6o
AVG. PREDICTED
MARKET SHARE
6.34
5.22
45.28
4.09
44.20
35.57
67.81
10.11
3.57
5.65
44.98
6.67
5.56
RMSE
1.61
.75
4.38
.59
3.71
6.14
2.08
4.44
.60
.71
9.24
3.28
1.12
AVG. ACTUAL
MARKET SHARE
7.53
5.34
45.66
24.40
4.23
36.04
44.64
34.95
67.70
14.30
3.59
5.66
48.10
9.53
5.68
STD DEV OF ACT.
MARKET SHARE
1.19
.73
2.21
3.29
.57
3.48
1.79
1.89
1.59
1.29
.64
.77
2.24
1.70
.70
TABLE 3.2: RESULTS OF REQUENCY SHARE ANALYSIS
High values of the RMSE statistic, compared with aMSA, in the hub cities
(Detroit, Memphis, and Minneapolis) indicate that the model was also
inadequate in these types of markets. Only in markets where the frequency
share and the market share were relatively close in value to each other, and in
markets where these values were relatively small (<10%), did this model
perform adequately. Examples of these markets include Rochester, Orlando,
Los Angeles, Chicago, St. Louis, and Boston.
The inability of the model to properly explain the variation in market
share in many of the originating cities was the result of several factors.
Although curves of market share vs. frequency share in each of the
originating city markets could not be produced (like Figure 2.1), the data in
Table -.2 clearly indicates that Northwest's MS and FS could not be part of an S-
shaped relationship. In the hub cities, where Northwest's frequency share
dominates, its market share was proportionately smaller, which is contrary to
the S-shaped assumption. The violation of this major assumption accounted for
most of the model's poor performance.
A second factor that affected this model's performance was the
measurement of frequency share. In cities like Huntsville, Saginaw, and
Madison (results were poor in each of these markets), Northwest and its
competitors operate a variety of aircraft. For example in Madison, Northwest
operated jet aircraft while some of its competitors were operating regional
turboprop aircraft with much smaller seating capacities. Although the
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carriers may have had equal frequency shares, clearly, the airline operating
DC-9's can offer many more seats in the market than the carrier operating
SF-340s, for example. Since no consideration was given to the type of aircraft
operated, large differences between a carrier's frequency share and market
share resulted. These large differences also resulted in the violation of the
S-shaped assumption and thus contributed to the model's poor performance in
many of these markets.
The results of this analysis indicate that either the general model
introduced in Equation 3.1 or the explanatory variable frequency share, or
both, are inadequate. In the next section of this chapter, a similar analysis
will be conducted using the same model formulation presented in Equation 3.1,
except that seat share will be used as the independent variable. The results
from this analysis wi 1 then be compared to the results presented in this
section.
3.4 Calibration of the MS-SS Model
As noted in Chapter Two, Simpson found that the statistic seat share, a
carrier's share of the total seats offered in a market, was statistically
equivalent to frequency share in the top origin and destination (0-D) markets
that he surveyed. The reason for this statistical equivalence was largely due to
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the fact that in the top domestic O-D markets, carriers operated very similar
equipment (capacity-wise). Also, there were very few, if any, regional
carriers operating in the top O-D markets, and as shown in the last section,
these can significantly alter the market share - frequency share relationship.
Perhaps, then, seat share would be a better explanatory variable. In
small markets such as Huntsville, Madison, and Saginaw, the statistic seat share
might account for differences in the equipment operated by the major and
regional carriers, and, would be more reflective of a carrier's true market
position. In large cities (e.g. Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles), however,
where the major carriers dominate both frequency and seat share, the effect
of the regional carriers' operations will not significantly alter a carrier's true
market position. Only in the markets where overall frequencies are low do the
effects of the regional carriers' opirations skew the relative market position
of the carriers in the market.
The market share model
SSS
(3.2)
is identical to the MS-FS model presented in Equation 3.1, only now the
independent variable is each carrier's seat share (SS). Given the similar
structure of the two models, the exponent a can be determined in the same
manner described in the previous section. The objective here, again, is to
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choose an x such that the RMSE,
X(MSPi - MSA)
1%6Ek = "FMSE r-1 (3.4)
is minimized.
Before proceeding with the calibration procedure in each of the fifteen
selected cities, it is again informative to analyze Northwest's market share vs.
seat share over the given time period. Figures 3-16 through 3-30 show this
relationship in each of the originating city markets. Similar to the MS-FS
curves, the MS-SS curves for the hub cities Detroit, Memphis, and Minneapolis
all have seat shares that are 10 to 40% higher than the corresponding market
shares. These figures also indicate that very littie correlation exists between
market share and seat share in these hub cities, which is contrary to the
assumption upon which the MS-SS model was constructed.
The MS-SS curves for Saginaw and Huntsville also exhibit some
unexpected results. Figure 3.28 (Saginaw) indicates that market share
increased as seat share decreased over the twenty-one months surveyed.
Obviously, seat share does not explain this variation in market share, a
variation that is most likely the result of levels of advertising and/or levels of
fares. Figure 3.19 (Huntsville) indicates that Northwest's market share is
significantly higher than its seat share (-5%-8%) over the time period
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surveyed. The same trend was also noted in this market's MS-FS relation.
Although both of these trends clearly demonstrate Northwest's dominance in
Huntsville, they also invalidate the MS-SS assumption. Because of these trends,
modeling Northwest's market share in both of these cities will, with the
proposed model, present some difficulties.
Using the algorithm outlined in Section 3.3, the exponent a was
determined for each of the selected markets. Table 3.3 lists the exponent a and
the resultant RMSE for each of these cities. Also included in this table are the
average predicted market share, the average actual market share, and the
standard deviation of the actual market share, aMSA ,for Northwest in each of
the selected cities.
The results shown in Table 3.3 ndicate that many of the same
conclusions drawn from the MS-FS analysis are also applicable to this analysis.
First, comparing the RMSE with GMSA in each of the hub cities indicates that
the statistic seat share does not fully account for the variation in market share
in these types of markets (at least as the variable seat share is used in this
specific model). As expected, the RMSE of the model calibrations in Huntsville
and Saginaw was significantly larger than the OMSA. As noted previously, this
type of model is not sufficient in markets where there are large differences
between market share and seat share (i.e. MS>SS). Such was also the case in
both the Omaha and Madison markets.
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CITY
BOSTON
CHICAGO
DETROIT
HUNTSVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MADISON
MEMPHIS
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
OMAHA
ORLANDO
ROCHESTER
SAGINAW
SEATITLE
ST. LOUIS
PREDICTED
EXPONENT
.59
.59
.77
.56
.62
.44
.46
.95
.84
.94
1.15
.88
1.05
1.16
.64
AVG. PREDIC 'ED
MARKET SI RE
7.51
5.29
45.87
18.35
4.18
36.08
44.26
34.89
68.10
11.59
3.63
5.66
44.98
9.65
5.58
RMSE
.89
.64
3.54
6.71
.34
2.68
3.28
2.62
1.74
3.00
1.47
.56
9.24
1.36
.74
AVG. ACTUAL
MARKET SHARE
7.53
5.34
45.66
24.40
4.23
36.04
44.64
34.95
67.70
14.30
3.59
5.66
48.10
9.53
5.68
STD DEV OF ACT.
MARKET SHARE
1.19
.73
2.21
3.29
.57
3.48
1.79
1.89
1.59
1.29
.64
.77
2.24
1.70
.70
TABLE 3.3: RESULTS OF SEAT SHARE ANALYSIS
The MS-SS model did perform adequately, however, in five of the fifteen
cities examined. The RMSE that resulted from the choice of a was less than
GMSA in Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago, Rochester, and St. Louis. Similar to the
MS-FS model, this model seems to perform satisfactorily in markets where
Northwest's market share and frequency share are small (<10%) and also,
where the difference between the two variables is small.
3.5 A Comparison of the MS-FS and the MS-SS
Models
The results presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 clearly indicate that the
general market share model proposed in Equation 3.1 (with either frequency
or seat share used as the explanatory variable) is not useful in certain types of
originating city markets. The inability of this model to correctly explain the
variation in a carrier's market share is largely due to the lack of an S-shaped
relationship between market share and frequency share, and between market
share and seat share. Since this assumption of an S-shaped relationship was
the cornerstone upon which this model was built, it is apparent why the model
behaves poorly in many of the markets analyzed.
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The results also suggest that there are vast differences between
originating city markets and origin-destination (O-D) markets. As Figures 3.1
through 3.30 indicate, Northwest's market share in many of the originating
cities did not always show positive correlation with frequency share or seat
share. These occurrences suggest that other variables, which characterize an
originating city market, need to be identified and modeled.
Although neither model (Equations 3.1 and 3.2) was particularly useful
in explaining the variation in a carrier's market share, a comparison of the
results of the two model calibrations does reveal some interesting conclusions.
By comparing the RMSEs in each market in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, it is clear that
seat share is a more useful variable in explaining market share (except in
Orlando). This result suggests that the statistical equivalence between seat
share and frequency share found in O-D markets is not valid in originating
city markets.
With the wide variety of equipment operated by airlines today, this
result is of no great surprise. Consider the simple case, for example, where
carriers A and B are the only two carriers operating in a market. Carrier A
operates six DC-9 flights a day and carrier B operates six B747 flights a day.
Although their frequency shares are equal, carrier B's seat share is 75% while
carrier A's is only 25%. Clearly, carrier B has a competitive advantage, one
that should be reflected in its market share. This does not suggest, however,
that frequency share is not important. When carriers are operating the same
or similar types of equipment (capacity wise), frequency share is of great
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importance. But in markets where carriers operate a diverse fleet of aircraft,
seat share is a more useful variable in explaining market share. This
conclusion will be of use in the next chapter.
1 In his Master's Thesis, "Competition in Air Transportation, An Economic
Approach", Gilles Renard refers to models that can not be solved using linear
least squares methods as "interactive models." The non-linear structure of the
models presented in Chapter Two, Equations 2.5-2.9 are clearly of this type. See
Renard, p.34.
2 Robert W. Simpson, Unpublished Course Notes for Air Transportation
Economics, Chapter Three, "The Demand for Air Transportation Services",
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Ma.: September, 1982 p.1 .
3 A travel agency plated sale simply refers to the sale of an airline ticket by a
travel agent to a consumer. In this analysis, Northwest's market share in an
originating city market is the ratio of travel agency plated sales on Northwest
to travel agency plated sales on all carriers.
4 The statistical software package "SOLO" was used in this analysis. SOLO is
distributed by BMDP Statistical Software; Los Angeles, California.
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CHAPTER 4
Application Of Market Share Regression
Models In Originating City Markets
4.1 Introduction
The literature review presented in Chapter Two revealed two broad
catego-i-e )f market share models that were applied to origin-destination (O-D)
markets. In Chapter Three, one such category of these models, classical
frequency share - seat share models, was applied to originating city markets.
Although Simpson and Renard both found that these types of models were useful
in explaining the variation in market share in O-D markets, they did not prove to
be extremely useful in originating city markets. The results of the model
calibrations in Chapter Three suggest that different types of models are necessary
to better explain the variation in market share in originating city markets.
The classical frequency share and seat share models calibrated in Chapter
Three predicted Northwest's market share as a function of both the airlines's
frequency share (or seat share) and its competitors' frequency share (or seat
share) in the particular market. The marginal results obtained from these
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calibrations suggest, however, that a carrier's market share in an originating
city market cannot be fully explained in terms of these statistics alone. Additional
independent variables that reflect the number of markets served out of these
originating cities and the manner in which they are served (e.g. non-stop, or
one-stop) are needed to better explain a carrier's market share. These new
variables or a completely different type of model, or both, are necessary to
improve upon the results obtained in Chapter Three.
A second type of market share model discussed in Chapter Two is one that
can be calibrated using linear regression techniques. Bond's [2] proposed market
share model,
MS= a x FS (4.1)
where a and 0 are carrier dependent, is one such model that can be easily
calibrated using linear regression methods after the model has undergone a
logarithmic transformation. Regression models of this type are attractive for two
reasons. First, unlike the models presented in Chapter Three, this type of
regression model does not require the input of statistics for every carrier
operating in the market. To calibrate Equation 4.1, only market share data and
frequency share data pertaining to the particular carrier are needed.
Computationally, this model is much simpler than the models presented in Chapter
Two. Secondly, regression models can be easily calibrated with very basic
statistical software programs. Time consuming iterative techniques like those
used in the previous chapter are not necessary to calibrate regression models.
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In this chapter, four regression market share models will be calibrated for
the selected originating city markets. In the second section of this chapter, using
a variation of Bond's market share model,
MS= a x SS (4.2)
(where the statistic seat share is used instead of frequency share, based upon the
results of the last chapter), the constant a and the exponent p will be determined
in each of the originating city markets gixen Northwest's market share and seat
share over the twenty-one month sample period.
In the third section of this chapter, the variable frequency share will be
added to the above formulation as a second explanatory variable. In the model
MS= a x SS' x FS (4.3)
the constant a and the exponents s i and s2, the elasticity of market share with
respect to seat share and frequency share, will be determined for Northwest's
service in each of the originating city markets. The results of a linear regression
analysis will be used to determine whether the variables seat share, frequency
share or both are needed to explain the variation in Northwest's market share.
Two new variables, a carrier's proportion of total non-stop markets, NSS,
and a carrier's proportion of total possible markets, PMS, served out of an
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originating city market will be included in Equation 4.3 in the fourth section of
this chapter. Using this new model,
S= a x SS ' x FS 2 x NSS xPMS (44)
where,
NSS= proportion of total non-stop markets served by all carriers
out of an originating city in which the chosen carrier offers
non-stop service;
PMS = proportion of the total possible markets served by all
carriers out of an originating city in which the chosen
carrier offers non-stop, direct, or feasible connecting service.
p3 = elasticity of market share with respect to NSS; and
4= elasticity of market share with respect to PMS,
a step-wise regression analysis will be conducted to determine which of the above
variables are most useful in explaining the variation in a carrier's market share.
The final model presented in this chapter uses the same variables as the
model in Equation 4.4; however, the structure of the model is somewhat different.
Instead of the non-linear form of the three previous models, the structure of this
model,
MS= A+ BSS+ BFS+ B3NSS + B PMS (45)
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is linear with respect to market share, and no transformations are required to
perform a regression analysis. The results of this step-wise regression analysis
will be presented in the fifth section of this chapter.
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, a comparison of the results of
these four model calibrations will be made. By examining the root mean square
errors (RMSE) of each of the four models, a determination will be made as to
whether these regression type models are more useful than the models calibrated
in Chapter Three. Conclusions will also be made as to which type of regression
model as well as which of the four independent variables examined are most
useful in explaining a carrier's market share in an originating city market.
4.2 Calibration of Seat Share Regression Model
Although neither of the models tested in Chapter Three fully explained the
variation in Northwest's market share, it was concluded that of the two
explanatory variables, frequency share and seat share, the latter was of greater
use. Based on this conclusion, the first regression market share model to be
calibrated in this chapter is based solely on the variable seat share. By
restricting this first model to one explanatory variable, a comparison can be made
between the classical seat share model (Equation 3.2) and the regression seat
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share model (Equation 4.2). This comparison will give rise to an assessment of the
two different model structures.
It was noted in Chapter Three that the relationship between market share
and seat share was not always linear in the fifteen originating city markets that
were examined. Figures 3.16 - 3.30 clearly indicated this non-linear relationship.
The seat share regression model,
MS= a x SS (4.2)
should be useful in modeling this relationship because of its non-linear structure
(unless 5 is equal to 1.0). In attempting to fit this model to the data shown in
Figures 3.16 - 3.30, the parameter P can be varied to account for the different non-
linear relationships in each of the originating city markets.
As stated in the Introduction, all of the market share models presented in
this chapter can be calibrated through linear regression. Thus, before
calibrating the seat share regression model, Equation 4.2 must be linearized.
Taking the natural log of both sides of this equation yields,
In(MS)=In(a x SS) (4.6)
which simplifies to
In(A) Iln(a) + # x I n(SS)4
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After taking the natural log of the market share data and the seat share data in
each of the fifteen selected cities, the parameters a and p can be determined
through a linear regression analysis.
The linearized model in Equation 4.7 assumes a linear relationship between
ln(MS) and ln(SS). Of course, if this assumption is false, then the results of the
model calibration will be poor. Figures 4.1-4.15 show the relationship between
ln(MS) and ln(SS) in each of the fifteen selected cites. Examination of these
scatter plots indicates that in Detroit (Figure 4.3), Mcmphis (Figure 4.7), and
Minneapolis (Figure 4.8), linear relationships between ln(MS) and ln(SS) cannot
be detected. Based on these figures, the accuracy of the model calibrations in
these cities will most likely be suspect. Also of interest is Figure 4.13, which
shows ln(MS) vs. ln(SS) in Saginaw. Although there appears to be a linear
relatioi.ship between these variables, it is, as noted in Chapter Three, contrary to
what is expected in the airline industry.
Applying the method of linear least squares to Equation 4.7, the intercept
and the slope, a and P respectively, are determined by minimizing
S(a,p) =X[In(MS,) - In (a) - fix In(SS,)]
i=1 (4.8)
where i=1,m is the number of months over which data is available. The
minimization of Equation 4.8 is relatively straightforward. First, the partial
derivatives of S with respect to a and P are calculated and set equal to zero, i.e.,
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1.00
= 0
da (4.9)
and
dS 0d# (4.10)
This set of linear equations can then be solved simultaneously to find the
parameters a and s.
Although this minimization technique can be employed manually without
great difficulty, computer algorithms are available which not only carry out this
procedure, but also calculate model performance statistics. 1 As in Chapter Three,
the maiir statistic that will be used to compare the perft ,nance of these models
the root mean square error (RMSE) which is given by,
I(MS, a x SS,)
FMSE = i=1
m- k (4.11)
where a and j are determined from the least squares regression and k is equal to
the number of estimated parameters (in this case k=2). This statistic is identical to
that used in Chapter Three (Equation 3.3) since MSi is the actual market share and
a x SSP is the predicted market share.
After transforming the market share and seat share data provided by
Northwest (described in Chapter Three), a linear regression was performed for
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each of the fifteen test markets. Table 4.1 shows the results of this linear
regression. For each city, the coefficients a and p are listed, followed by the
RMSE; the adjusted coefficient of determination, Rc 2 ; the average predicted
market share, MSP; the average actual market share MSA; and the standard
deviation of the actual market share, GMSA, over the sample period. Also
presented in Table 4.1 are the t-statistics for the estimated parameter p (in
parentheses underneath the parameter). As in Chapter Three, the RMSE statistic
should be compared with the standard deviation of the actual market share data.
At a minimum, the RMSE should be lower than aMSA; the lower it is, the better the
fit.
The results in Table 4.1 show that in thirteen of the fifteen cities, the RMSE
is lower than GMSA; only in Detroit and Minneapolis was the RMSE higher.
However, in Memphis and Orlando, the RMSE was equal to and only slightly lower
than GMSA, respectively. Similar to the case in Chapter Three, this mcdel does not
explain Northwest's market share in its three major hubs very well. As indicated
earlier, this result was not unexpected since the figures showing ln(MS) vs.
ln(SS) indicated a very weak linear relationship in these three cities.
The t-statistics for each of the estimated Ps indicate the significance of the
seat share variable in explaining Northwest's market share. 2 Values of this
statistic which are less than -2.0 and greater than 2.0 reflect an acceptably high
level of confidence (-95%) that the estimated coefficient (p) is significantly
different from zero. Analysis of these statistics in Table 4.1 indicates a low level of
confidence in the coefficient P only in the hub cities. This again suggests that the
model performs poorly in these types of markets.
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CITY RMSE Rc 2  MSP MSA GMSA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOSTON' 1.98 .6936 .94 .44 7.49 7.53 1.19
(4.09)
CHICAGO 2.48 .6897 .57 .43 5.32 5.34 .73
(4.03)
DETROIT 79.79 -. 1333 2.24 .02 45.63 45.66 2.21
(-.59)
HUNTSVILLE 3.56 .6699 1.99 .64 24.32 24.40 3.29
(6.02)
LOS ANGELES 1.90 .6931 .35 .64 4.21 4.23 .57
(6.10)
MADISON 2.99 .6588 2.68 .37 35.94 36.04 3.48
(3.54)
MEMPHIS 712.9 -. 6303 2.73 .03 44.61 44.64 1.79
(-1.28)
MILWAUKEE 10.66 .3297 1.63 .24 34.92 34.95 1.89
(2.70)
MINNEAPOLIS 86.64 -. 0565 1.63 .0 67.69 67.70 1.59
(-.17)
OMAHA 4.46 .4748 1.08 .28 14.26 14.30 1.29
(2.95)
ORLANDO 2.56 .2380 .64 .22 3.63 3.59 .64
(2.60)
ROCHESTER .85 1.1851 .58 .42 5.63 5.66 .77
(3.91)
SAGINAW 86.44 -. 1469 2.07 .15 48.06 48.10 2.24
(-2.12)
SEATTLE 1.41 .8411 1.34 .40 9.45 9.53 1.70
(3.83)
ST. LOUIS 1.82 1.2725 .62 .16 5.65 5.68 .70
(2.15)
TABLE 4.1: RESULTS OF SEAT SHARE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
As stated in the Introduction, the exponent p in Equation 4.2 represents the
elasticity of market share with respect to seat share. A value that is positive and
greater than 1.0 implies a more than proportional increase in market share with
an increase in seat share. For the case, 0<p<1.0, an increase in seat share implies a
less than proportional increase in market share. The implication of a negative p
(the only significant -@ was in Saginaw) is a loss in market share with increasing
seat share; this is, of course, counter-intuitive. The overall significance of the
exponent P will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.
Finally, in Table 4.1, the adjusted coefficient of determination, Rc 2 , from
the linear regression analysis is listed for each test market. This statistic provides
a relative measure of the strength of the relationship that has been fit by least
squares. 3  The Rc 2 statistic can also be interpreted as the proportion of the
variability of the dependent variable kmarket share) that is explained by the
independent variables (in this model, only seat share). As expected, since this
model performed poorly in the three hub cities, the Rc 2 values in these markets
are all close to zero. Disregarding the three hub cities, Rc 2 varied from .16 in
St. Louis to .64 in Los Angeles and Huntsville. This higher value implies that 64%
of the variation in Northwest's market share in these two cities is explained by
seat share. These lower values suggest that other explanatory variables might be
included in Equation 4.2 as a means of further explaining a carrier's market share
out of an originating city.
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4.3 Calibration of Seat Share-Frequency Share
Regression Model
Of the three models tested thus far, clearly, the simple exponential seat
share model from the last section has provided the best results. Except for the
three hub cities, this model has produced satisfactory results (significant @
coefficients and RMSE<aMSA) in all of the originating city markets. However,
analysis of the Rc 2 statistic in Table 4.1 seems to indicate that other independent
variables are necessary to further explain the variation in a carrier's market
share in an originating city market.
In Chapter Three, it was concluded that seat share was a more useful
variable than frequency share in modeling the variation in a carrier's market
share. However, as discussed previously, if two carriers operating in a market
have equal seat shares yet different frequency shares, then the carrier offering
more departures is likely to have a competitive advantage. Since the results of the
last section seem to indicate that further independent variables are needed in the
market share model, including frequency share in Equation 4.2 may be of value.
The structure of the market share model in Equation 4.2 is extremely useful
because it allows one to include further independent variables in a manner that
still permits calibration by linear least squares. The exponential model in
Equation 4.2 can be extended by simply multiplying the right hand side of this
equation by the new independent variable raised to its elasticity. This new model,
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A = a x SS' x FS (43)
where p2 is the elasticity of market share with respect to frequency share, will be
calibrated in the fifteen test cities to determine if frequency share can be used to
further explain the variation in a carrier's market share.
The model in Equation 4.3 must first be linearized, however, before the
method of linear least squares can be applied. Taking the natural log of both sides
of this equation yields
In(A))= In(a x SSP' x FSP2) (4.12)
which simplifies to
In(M ) = In(a) + px In(SS) + #2 xIn(FS) (4.13)
Equation 4.13 not only assumes a linear relationship between ln(MS) and
ln(SS) as in the previous section, but it also assumes a linear relationship between
ln(MS) and ln(FS). This further assumption is easily checked by plotting ln(MS)
vs. ln(FS) in each of the fifteen test markets. Figures 4.16 - 4.30 depict this
relationship for the twenty-one months of data described in Chapter Three.
Similar to the plots of ln(MS) vs. ln(SS) in the previous section, the scatter
plots in the hub cities do not exhibit a strong linear relationship. In addition to
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the weak relationships shown in these markets, the plots of ln(MS) vs. ln(FS) in
Madison (Figure 4.21), Milwaukee (Figure 4.24), and Rochester (Figure 4.27) also
show non-linear trends between these two variables. Based upon these figures, it
is doubtful whether the inclusion of frequency share in Equation 4.3 will improve
the overall accuracy of the regressive market share model in these markets.
Applying the method of linear least squares to Equation 4.13, the
parameters a, s1, and $2 are determined by minimizing
m)]S(a,fp, #2 )= XIn (MS) - I n(a) - P x I n(SS,) - 2 x In (FS,)]
=1 (4.14)
where, as before, i=1,m is the number of months over which data is available. The
mization of Equation 4.14 is identical to that desc ibed in the nrevious section
with the addition of a third partial derivative,
dS 0
12 (4.15)
Equations 4.9, 4.10, and 4.15 form a set of linear equations that can be solved
simultaneously to find the parameters a, si, and $2.
Using the seat share, frequency share, and market share data described in
Chapter Three, a multiple linear regression of Equation 4.13 was performed in
each of the fifteen originating city markets. Table 4.2 shows the estimated
parameters a, pi, and P2 from the regression analysis along with the t-statistics
(underneath the parameter and in parentheses) for each of the coefficients. Also
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CITY api 2 RMSE Rc 2  MSP
BOSTON 1.94 .4711 .3406 .95 .46 7.49
(1.78) (1.09)
CHICAGO 2.48 .6897 .57 .41 5.32
(4.03)
DETROIT 85.34 .9226 -1.06 2.10 .17 45.63
(1.50) (-1.84)
HUNTSVILLE 3.16 .0970 .6850 1.74 .72 24.35
(.40)
LOS ANGELES 1.79 .7893 -.0925 .35 .63 4.21
(2.32) (-.30)
MADISON 2.99 .6588 2.73 .37 35.94
(3.54)
MEMPHIS 1956 -.8509 1.72 .08 44.61
(-1.64)
MILWAUKEE 10.12 .3603 -.0167 1.68 .20 34.92
(1.47) (-.15)
MINNEAPOLIS 7.90 -1.0267 1.5123 1.56 .04 67.69
(-1.56) (1.69)
OMAHA 5.16 .4412 .98 .47 14.27
(6.87)
ORLANDO 1.88 -.3752 .9688 .42 .53 3.57
(-2.08) (3.69)
ROCHESTER 2.11 1.4000 -.8733 .57 .42 5.63
(3.89) (-1.09)
SAGINAW 95.07 -. 1469 .1025 2.10 .13 48.06
(-2.12) (1.70)
SEATTLE 1.80 .5887 .1962 1.33 .40 9.45
(1.67) (.92)
ST. LOUIS 3.33 .6529 .59 .26 5.65
(2.7-,
TABLE 4.2: RESULTS OF SS - FS REGRESSION ANALYSIS
shown in Table 4.2 are the RMSE; the adjusted coefficient of determination, Rc 2;
and the average predicted market share, MSP. As before, the RMSE should be
compared with the standard deviation of the actual market share (aMSA, provided
in Table 4.1) to assess the accuracy of the model.
In assessing the significance of each coefficient, t-statistics which are less
than -2.0 and greater than 2.0 indicate an acceptable level of significance. The
values of some coefficients were listed even if the t-statistic indicated a lack of
confidence in the parameter estimate, except in some cases when the t-statistic
indicated extremely low levels of confidence. Table 4.2 indicates that except for
Orlando, there are no cities that show two significant values of p. However, the
negative P1 coefficient found in this city may not be of practical use.
Although this negative 1 coefficient improves the overall "goodness of fit"
for the regression model, the use of this model (with the negative coefficient) to
forecast market share may lead to questionable results. Since there are many
other forces that affect a carrier's market share, a negative elasticity does not
necessarily imply a causal relationship (i.e. a loss in market share caused by an
increase in seat share). Including this negative coefficient in a forecasting
model would suggest to management that travel agency market share quotas
should be reduced with a projected increase in seat share, which, of course, makes
no sense.
The results in Table 4.2 show that in four of the cities: Huntsville, Orlando,
Omaha, and St. Louis, frequency share is a more significant explanatory variable
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than seat share. The lower RMSE statistic in each of these cities, compared with
the RMSE of these same cities in Table 4.1, also indicates that frequency share is a
better predictor variable than seat share. Except for the three hub cities (Detroit,
Memphis, and Minneapolis) seat share was still the best predictor variable in the
remaining cities. Although Table 4.2 shows that for some cities (e.g. Boston)
neither P1i nor $2 was significant, Table 4.1 clearly indicates that a regression
with seat share alone produced a significant P1. Thus, if the multiple regression
of Equation 4.3 does not produce at least one significant P when both variables are
included, then a step wise regression (discussed in the next section) can be used to
identify which of the variables is significant.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that neither seat share nor frequency share (or
a combination of them) are very useful in explaining a carrier's market share in
a hub city. The scatter plots of ln(MS) vs.ln(SS) and ln(MS) vs. ln(FS) in each of
these markets did not reveal a strong linear relationship between these variables,
and thus, this result was not unexpected. Perhaps the inclusion of other
independent variables in Equation 4.3, conducted in the next section, will improve
the results of the modeling in the hub cities.
Finally, although the Rc 2 statistic was lower in the four cities where
frequency share was found to be a more useful variable, Table 4.2 suggests that
further explanatory variables might still be included in Equation 4.3. In the next
section of this chapter, two new variables, a carrier's share of the total non-stop
markets served by all airlines and a carrier's share of the total possible markets
served by all airlines, will be included in Equation 4.3. By calibrating this model
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in the fifteen test markets, an assessment will then be made with respect to the
usefulness of these new parameters.
4. 4 Calibration of the Mutivariable Multiplicative
Regression Model
As demonstrated in the previous section, the structure of the simple
multiplicative market share model (Equation 4.4) is extremely useful because it
allows one to include additional independent variables in a manner that still
permits calibration by linear least squares. In the previous section, frequency
share was included in the original model and was found to be a more significant
variable than seat share in four out of the fifteen test markets. However, the
coefficient of determination, Rc 2 , in Table 4.2 indicated that there was still room
for additional parameters to further explain the variation in a carrier's market
share. In this section, two new independent variables will be added to Equation
4.3 in an attempt to further explain a carrier's market share in an originating
city market.
The first variable to be included in Equation 4.3 is a carrier's share of the
total non-stop markets served by all airlines out of an originating city market.
Since air travelers generally prefer non-stop service over one or two-stop
service, a carrier that offers a more than proportional share of the non-stop
106
flights should gain a more than proportional share of the originating market. If
two carriers have identical seat shares and frequency shares, then the carrier
serving more non-stop destinations should have a competitive advantage. Using
data provided by Northwest Airlines (as tabulated from OAG tapes), its share of the
total non-stop markets served by all airlines, given by,
NSS = total # Northwest non-stop markets (4.16)
total # non-stop markets all carriers
was determined in the fifteen test markets over the twenty-two month sample
period. 4
The second variable to be included in Equation 4.3 is a carrier's share of the
total possible markets (which includes through flights and all viable
connections) served by all carriers out of an originating city market. Obviously,
the more destinations that an airline offers the consumer, the better its chances
are of meeting that consumer's demand. If two carriers operating in a market
have identical seat shares and frequency shares, then the carrier who offers a
greater number of destinations to the consumer should enjoy a competitive
advantage. Using data provided by Northwest Airlines (again, as tabulated from
OAG tapes), its share of the total possible markets served, given by,
PMS = total # Northwest markets served (4.17)
total # markets served all carriers
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was determined in the fifteen test markets over the twenty-two month sample
period.
Including these two new variables into Equation 4.3 yields
MS= a x SS' x FS2 x NSS3 x PMS (4.18)
where p3 is the elasticity of market share with respect to non-stop share and p4 is
the elasticity of market share with respect to a carrier's share of possible markets
served.
Similar to the previous models, Equation 4.18 must first be linearized before
calibration by linear least squares is possible. Taking the natural log of both sides
of Equation 4.18 yields
In(AS)=ln(a x SS'x FS x NSS' x PMS') (4.19)
which simplifies to
In(MS) =In(a) +pixIn(SS) +P2 xIn(FS) +P3 xIn(ASS) +p4 xIn(PMS) . (4.20)
This equation can now be calibrated using the technique of linear least squares.
Again, it should be noted that Equation 4.20 assumes a linear relationship between
ln(MS) and all the explanatory variables given in this equation.
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Applying the method of linear least squares to Equation 4.14, the
parameters a, 1, p2, p3 , and p4 are determined by minimizing
m
S(a,p3ppa34 )=X [(I n (MS)- I n (a)- p, In (S3,) - pn(FS) - p I n (AS) - P, In( PMS,)]
S =1
(4.21)
over the i=1,m months of data. The minimization of this equation is identical to
that described in the previous sections with the addition of two partial derivatives,
dS
=0
dA (4.22)
and
dS
d.#4 . (4.23)
Equations 4.8, 4.9, 4.15, 4.23, and 4.24 form a set of linear equations that can be
solved simultaneously to find the parameters a, pi, p2, p3, and p4
In calibrating Equation 4.20 in the fifteen originating city markets, a type
of regression analysis referred to as "step-wise regression" was employed. A step-
wise regression analysis will add the independent variables in Equation 4.21, one
at a time, depending both on the contribution it makes to the model (i.e. whether
the included variable reduces the RMSE) and on the value of its t-statistic. After
the best independent variable is chosen, the other independent variables are
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added to the equation, one at a time, and tested for significance. 5  The procedure
continues until no more variables can be added or deleted from the equation. The
benefit of this type of regression analysis is that it insures that only the
significant independent variables will be kept in the model.
Table 4.3 shows the results of this step-wise regression analysis of Equation
4.20 in the fifteen test markets. Values for a, pi, $2, 03, and p4 are listed, with their
respective t-statistics (underneath and in parentheses) if the variable was found
to be significant. Also shown in Table 4.3 are the RMSE; the adjusted coefficient of
determination, Rc 2 ; and the average predicted market share, MSP. As before, the
RMSE should be compared with the standard deviation of the actual market share
data (GMSA, provided in Table 4.1) to assess the accuracy of the model.
The results of this analysis indicate that in fourteen of the fifteen test
markets (except Memphis), at least one of the two new variables included in
Equation 4.19 was found to be significant. In some of these markets, however, the
coefficient was found to be negative, which, although statistically possible, is
counter-intuitive. Table 4.3 also indicates that except for Saginaw and Seattle, at
least one of the variables, either seat share or frequency share, was found to be
significant. The Rc 2 statistic also showed improvement in markets where more
than one explanatory variable was found to be significant.
A comparison of the RMSE statistic between Table 4.3 and Tables 4.1 and 4.2
clearly indicates that of the models tested thus far, this multivariable
multiplicative regression model produces the best overall results. Since this
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CITY
BOSTON
CHICAGO
DETROIT
HUNTSVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MADISON
MEMPHIS
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
OMAHA
ORLANDO
ROCHESTER
SAGINAW
SEATTLE
ST. LOUIS
TABLE 4.3: RESULTS OF MULTIVARIABLE MULTIPLICATIVE
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
$4
9.30
33.10
.04
1.58
.49
34.81
1959
20.49
4.18
3.22
4.62
.002
52.46
77.48
101.5
Rc 2
.87
.79
.53
.92
.68
.56
.08
.35
1.17
(7.44)
.65
(2.00)
1.50
(4.05)
.96
(5.37)
-.09
(-1.44)
-.23
(-1.60)
2.31
(3.75)
1.19
(2.45)
-.72
(-3.54)
-. 96
(-2.48)
.77
(12.30)
.13
(1.50)
-.85
(-1.64)
.23
(3.51)
.79
(3.68)
.63
(7.31)
.52
(2.19)
-1.20
(-3.59)
.65
(7.71)
.47
(4.66)
-.71
(-4.90)
.12
(1.45)
.71
(-4.90)
-.33
(-6.57)
-. 30
(-1.85)
-.99
(-1.60)
.79
(5.01)
.83
(6.55)
.27
(5.12)
.16
(2.63)
.08
(2.56)
.09
(1.69)
.25
(3.63)
-.48
(-1.69)
.12
(3.17)
.07
(2.06)
RMSE
.44
.32
1.87
.99
.34
2.28
1.88
1.58
1.65
.90
.32
.56
2.02
1.23
.36
MSP
7.52
5.33
45.66
24.23
4.22
35.98
44.61
34.92
67.69
14.28
3.57
5.64
48.07
.51
.72
.50
.31
.56
.77
9.47
5.67
model includes all of the independent variables tested in the previous sections,
the step-wise regression of Equation 4.19 guarantees that, at a minimum, this
model will be as good as the two previous models. The addition of the new
independent variables, NSS and PMS, if found to be significant, can only improve
upon the results of the two previous sections.
With these four independent variables: SS, FS, NSS, and PMS, a linear
multiple regression model will be calibrated in the next section of this chapter.
Having found variables that are significant in almost every city (except
Memphis), this analysis will indicate whether the non-linearized structure of the
models tested in the three previous sections can be altered so as to improve upon
the accuracy of the model results obtained thus far.
4.5 Calibration of the Multivariable Linear Regression
Model
In the last three sections of this chapter, four independent variables have
been tested for their ability to explain the variation in a carrier's market share in
an originating city market. The results have indicated that in thirteen of the
fifteen test markets either seat share or frequency share was necessary to explain
the variation in a carrier's market share. Of the two new variables included in
the last section, it was determined that in thirteen of the fifteen test markets
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either non-stop share or share of total possible markets served improved the
overall accuracy of the model.
The three market share models presented thus far in this chapter have
assumed a non-linear relationship between market share and the four
independent variables. Recall that a natural logarithmic transformation was
required to linearize the models before calibration by linear least squares could
be carried out. Although the results in the last section have substantiated the use
of such a model structure, there are other ways of combining these four variables
which might lead to an improved market share model. In this section of Chapter
Four, the linear multiple regression model
MS= A+ BSS+ BFS+ BNSS + BPMS (45)
where A, B1 , B2, B3 , and B4 are constants, will be calibrated in the fifteen
originating city markets. Having already calibrated a market share model using
these same independent variables, the results of the calibration of Equation 4.5
will allow an assessment to be made concerning the general structure of these two
models.
Since Equation 4.5 is already linear with respect to market share, the
method of linear least squares can be applied to determine the constants A, B1 , B2 ,
B 3, and B4. As before, these constants are determined by minimizing
m 2
S( A,B,B2,B1,,B)= J(MS - A- BSS - B2 FSi- BNISS,- B PMS )23 =4 i i 2 i 3 4 I
i=1 (4.25)
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where i=1,m is the number of months over which data is available. The
minimization of Equation 4.25 is identical to the procedure described in Section
4.4. Partial derivatives of S with respect to A, B1 , B2, B3, and B4 are set equal to
zero to form five linear equations. These equations can then be solved
simultaneously to find estimates of the five parameters.
The results of this model calibration are presented in Table 4.4. Estimates of
the five parameters are listed with the respective t-statistics underneath and in
parentheses, if the estimate was found to be significant. Also shown in Table 4.4
are the RMSE; the adjusted coefficient of determination, Rc 2 ; and the average
predicted market share, MSP. A comparison of the RMSE statistic with the
standard deviation of the actual market share data (aMSA provided in Table 4.1)
should be made to assess the model's performance.
Analysis of the results presented in Table 4.4 indicates that either the
variable frequency share or the variable seat share still plays a dominant role in
explaining a carrier's market share. At least one of these variables was
determined to be significant in twelve of the fifteen cities. Although in five of
the markets both of these variables were found to be statistically significant, one
of the coefficients, Bi or B2, was negative. As before, a negative coefficient
implies a counter-intuitive relationship between market share and either seat
share or frequency share.
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CITY
BOSTON
CHICAGO
DETROIT
HUNTSVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MADISON
MEMPHIS
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
OMAHA
ORLANDO
ROCHESTER
SAGINAW
SEATILE
ST. LOUIS
TABLE 4.4: RESULTS OF MULTIVARIABLE LINEAR
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
B2 B3 B4
50.01
(8.83)
24.84
(5.28)
-141.29
(-4.10)
-7.74
(-1.65)
35.57
(5.95)
8.17
(1.44)
25.17
(3.01)
-.10
3.98
-16.50
13.75
1.49
22.46
93.79
21.73
67.70
7.14
1.65
.48
41.87
1.34
3.15
RMSE
.42
.32
1.66
.99
.32
2.10
1.68
1.43
1.59
Rc 2
.88
.81
.43
.91
.68
.64
.12
.43
127.20
(8.23)
117.90
(2.06)
108.90
(3.41)
192.80
(3.70)
-20.42
(-2.13)
252.60
(3.65)
176.99
(1.27)
-163.25
(-4.33)
-193.32
(-2.56)
142.95
(11.49).
-82.49
(-1.17)
20.73
(1.57)
-60.93
(-2.10)
23.83
(4.00)
93.08
(4.31)
53.75
(2.42)
-262.20
(-2.60)
32.43
(1.33)
40.38
(1.50)
-80.30
(-5.92)
-39.48
(-1.93)
26.19
,-1.87)
-152.77
(-1.42)
78.68
(4.00)
118.22
(2.98)
MSP
7.53
5.34
45.68
24.24
4.23
36.04
44.64
34.95
67.70
14.30
3.59
5.66
48.10
.90
8.89
(4.31)
-18.87
(-1.59)
12.29
(3.33)
12.15
(1.97)
5.60
(1.38)
.29
.54
1.83
1.20
.35
.51
.79
.52
.34
.50
.76
9.53
5.68
The two new variables considered in the last section, non-stop share and
total possible markets share, were also found to be significant in this model. As
indicated in Table 4.4, at least one of these variables was found to be significant in
fourteen of the fifteen test markets. However, in five of the markets where one of
these variables was significant, either B3 or B4 was negative; this again, is
counter-intuitive.
A comparison of the RMSE statistics in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicates that the
multiple variable linear market share model (Equation 4.5) performed better than
the multiplicative market share model (Equation 4.4) in eleven of the fifteen test
markets. However, the inclusion of negative coefficients, which were found to be
statistically significant in the linear market share model (Equation 4.5), can
affect the calculation of this RMSE statistic. Analysis of Tables 4.3 and 4.4
indicates that in ten of the fifteen markets (ten from each table), negative
coefficients were found to be significant. Since removal of the negative
coefficients would affect the performance of the model, a comparison of these
models based solely on the RMSE statistic may not be of great use.
4.6 Summary
Thus far, two broad categories of market share models have been calibrated
in the fifteen originating city markets. In Chapter Three, the results of the
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classical seat share - frequency share model calibrations indicated that these
types of models were not extremely useful in explaining the variation in a
carrier's market share out of an originating city. However, the results of Sections
4.2 and 4.3 indicated that these same two variables (seat share and frequency
share) used in market share regression models, Equations 4.2 and 4.3,
satisfactorily explain the variation in market share in the majority of the markets
analyzed. Clearly, the structure of the models presented in this chapter was
superior to the structure of the models calibrated in Chapter Three.
Four independent variables: a carrier's seat share, frequency share, share
of the total non-stop markets, and share of the total possible markets have been
identified and tested in this chapter. Each of these variables, to some extent,
helped explain the variation in a carrier's market share. The results indicated
that except for the three hub cities, a combination of these variables, although
never more than two, could be found to satisfactorily explain a carrier's market
share in an originating city market. A discussion of the model's poor
performance in the hub cities will be included in the last chapter of this thesis.
To assess which of the four models presented in this chapter best explain a
carrier's market share, it is really only necessary to compare the results obtained
from the calibration of Equations 4.4 and 4.5. As stated earlier, the market share
model in Equation 4.4 is really just an extension of the two previous models given
in Equations 4.2 and 4.3. By using a step-wise linear regression to calibrate
Equation 4.4, the results are guaranteed, at a minimum, to be as good as those
obtained from Equations 4.2 and 4.3. Although a comparison of the RMSE statistics
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from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicated that the market share model presented in
Equation 4.5 was superior, the large number of negative coefficients obtained
from the calibration of this model may not be desirable -- particularly if the
objective is to forecast market share based on changes in the service variables.
The final chapter of this thesis will discuss, in more detail, both the pros and cons
of each of these models and the practical significance of the estimated s
coefficients.
1 The statistical software package "SOLO" was used in this analysis. SOLO is
distributed by BMDP Statistical Software; Los Angeles, California.
2 For a complete explanation and derivation of the t-statistic, see John A. Rice,
Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis, Wadsworth & Brooks, Pacific Grove,
California, 1988, p. 461.
3 For a complete explanation and derivation of the Rc 2 statistic, see Rice, p. 494.
4 An additional month of data was obtained and used in the calibration of
equation 4.18. This additional month worth of data was added to the data bases for
the fifteen selected originating city markets.
5 For this analysis, the parameter was considered significant if its t-statistic was
less than -1.5 or greater than 1.5.
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CHAPTER 5
Summary and Conclusions
5.1 Overview
The major question addressed in this thesis concerns how an airline might
predict its share of the passenger market out of an originating city market. As
described in Chapter One, each year air carriers pay travel agents millions of
dollars in commission fees for the sale of airline tickets. In addition to the
standard comnis: ons, travel gents are also given other monetary incentive
(commission overrides), usually an additional fixed percentage of the total ticket
price, when an agency's sales of that airline's tickets exceed a certain volume.
How airlines structure these override programs can significantly affect their
profit potential. Whether the override program is based on a volume of sales by
the travel agent or a specific carrier share achieved by the agent, the setting of a
baseline goal for a travel agent to meet can be of critical importance.
In an effort to predict or forecast a carrier's market share in an
originating city, mathematical models which relate a carrier's market share to a
set of exogenous variables describing an airline's operations, were employed.
However, in order to make a confident forecast, these models first had to be tested
and calibrated in various types of markets, using historical data to assess
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their "goodness of fit". The purpose of this thesis was to apply previously
developed market share models, and new derivatives of these models, in
originating city markets in order to identify which variables are most important
in predicting an airline's share of the originating passengers.
In Chapter Three of this thesis, classical seat share and frequency share
models were calibrated and tested in fifteen originating city markets. Although
these models were previously found to be very effective in modeling a carrier's
market share in origin-destination (O-D) markets, their application in
originating city markets was less encouraging. In Chapter Four, a completely
different structure of a market share model, one which could be calibrated using
linear regression techniques, was tested in the fifteen selected originating
markets. The encouraging results obtained from this first model, which was also
originally proposed for use in O-D markets, led to the development and testing of
more extensive models in an attempt to further explain the variation in a
carrier's market share. Both a linear and non-linear structure of a multivariable
regression model were calibrated in the test markets and were able to pass
standard statistical goodness of fit tests.
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5.2 Findings and Conclusions
The results of the classical market share-frequency share model
calibration (Equation 3.1) presented in Table 3.2 indicated that this model could
not effectively explain the variation in a carrier's market share out of an
originating city. A similar model (Equation 3.2), using seat share as the
explanatory variable instead of frequency share, was also calibrated in the
fifteen test markets. As indicated in Table 3.3, this classical market share-seat
share model produced acceptable results in only six of the fifteen test markets.
Although neither model was particularly useful in explaining the variation in a
carrier's market share, a comparison of the results did reveal that seat share was
more useful than frequency share in explaining a carrier's originating city
market share.
The inability of these two models to correctly explain this variation in a
carrier's market share was largely due to the lack of an S-shaped relationship
between market share and frequency share and between market share and seat
share. It was this S-shaped relationship, previously noted in O-D markets, that
was the cornerstone upon which this model was built. Since Northwest's market
share-seat share and market share-frequency share data clearly did not fit this
S-shaped relationship, the model's inadequacy in originating markets was not
surprising.
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The structure of these classical market share models also posed several
difficulties. Since neither model could satisfactorily explain the variation in
market share, a model which included both of these variables would have been
desirable. However, the structure of the models in Equations 3.1 and 3.2 could not
easily accept more than one independent variable at a time -- at least in a manner
that would have some theoretical basis. In addition to this difficulty, the exponent
a in each of these models (in cities where the models were statistically sound) was
difficult to interpret. Unlike the first three models of Chapter Four, the exponent
was not a true elasticity of market share and, therefore, could not be used to assess
the effects of changes in service variables (either frequency share or seat share)
on market share.
The results of the seat share regression model in Section 4.2, indicated that
this simple market share regression model was statistically significant in twelve
of the fifteen selected markets (significant p coefficients were not found in the
hub cities). By comparing this model, which used seat share as the only
explanatory variable, with the classical seat share model calibrated in Chapter
Three, it became clear that the market share regression model was superior.
Since both models used only seat share in their formulations, this comparison
allowed an assessment to be made concerning the model structure. Because the
regression model was able to explain a carrier's market share in twice as many
cities as the classical model, further testing of more extensive market share
regression models was justified.
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Analysis of the coefficient of determination, Rc 2 , from this seat share
regression model (Table 4.1) indicated that other explanatory variables were
needed to better explain the variation in a carrier's market share. In Section 4.3,
frequency share was added to the non-linear regression model, and in Section 4.4,
the variables non-stop share and share of the total possible markets served were
also added. The resultant non-linear regression model in Section 4.4, which
included four explanatory variables, was then calibrated using a step-wise
regression technique.
The inclusion of these three additional variables in the basic seat share
regression model significantly improved the explained variation in a carrier's
market share, as indicated in Table 4.4. The results of this step-wise regression
analysis also indicated that in almost every market tested, one of the variables,
either frequency share or seat share (but not both), was found to be a significant
explanatory variable. Since these two variables are highly correlated, it is no
surprise that only one of them is needed in the model. However, including both of
these variables in the initial model is still recommended because in some markets
frequency share was found to be more significant, and in other markets seat
share proved to be more significant. Also, by using the step-wise regression
technique, variables that are not found to be significant are automatically
discarded, and thus, the final model is not biased by the inclusion of insignificant
variables.
It was also noted that of the two variables, non-stop share and share of the
total possible markets, one of them, but rarely both, was found to be significant in
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almost all of the test markets. By comparing the Rc2 statistics in Tables 4.2 and 4.3,
it is noted that in thirteen of the fifteen test markets, inclusion of at least one of
these variables improves the amount of explained variation in a carrier's market
share. As noted above, although one of the variables may not be significant in a
given market, it is still prudent to include both variables in the model and let the
step-wise regression analysis determine which of these two variables should be
included in the final model specification.
Although the results of the non-linear regression analysis showed that this
model was very useful in explaining the variation in a carrier's market share,
another variation of this model, a linear combination of the four explanatory
variables, was proposed and tested in the fifteen selected cities. A comparison of
the RMSE statistics for the non-linear and linear regression models, given in
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively, indicates that both models contained
approximately the same level of error (the RMSE for the linear model was only
marginally better in eleven of the fifteen markets). Although the two models
may be statistically equivalent, the non-linear regression model Equation 4.4 is
preferred over the linear model for several reasons.
First, as its name indicates, the linear regression model assumes a linear
relationship between the dependent variable (market share) and the four
explanatory variables: seat share; frequency share; non-stop share; and share of
the total possible markets. However, Figures 3.1-3.30, which show market share
vs. frequency share and market share vs. seat share in the fifteen selected cities
over the twenty-one month sample period, indicate that for the majority of the
124
markets, these relationships cannot be characterized as linear. Although the
linear market share model was still effective in these test markets, attempting to
explain a non-linear relationship with a linear model in other markets may not
prove to be as successful.
The practical interpretation of the estimated parameters (1, p2, p3, and p4)
in the non-linear model is a second reason why the non-linear model is preferred
over the linear one. As described in Chapter Four, each of these parameters
represents an elasticity of market share with respect to the four explanatory
variables. These elasticities can be used by airline management to estimate the
effect on market share with changes in the variable that they represent. As
such, these elasticities can be used as an additional decision making tool for
establishing the levels of service in the various markets. The coefficients bi, b2,
b3, and b4, on the othei hand, cannot be interpreted so easily. The coefficient bi,
for example, represents the change in market share with a one unit change in
seat share, with the three other variables held fixed (which is not a true
elasticity). Although this may present management with some useful
information, it is not as useful a tool as the true elasticities in helpling
management establish levels of service in the various markets.
As noted in Chapter Four, both the non-linear and linear regression models
contained estimated coefficients that were found to be negative. This result was
not surprising because the slope of the observed relationship between market
share and seat share and between market share and frequency share in some of
the fifteen selected cities was actually negative. Although these negative
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coefficients certainly improved the overall goodness of fit for both models, using
these negative coefficients in models used for forecasting could lead to
questionable results. The counter-intuitive relationship observed in Saginaw, for
example, does not necessarily imply that a decline in market share is caused by an
increase in frequency share. Therefore, a model based on this counter-intuitive
relationship may not be of great use.
Quite obviously, there are many other forces at work, such as competitor
fares, advertising, and frequent flyer programs, which can affect a carrier's
market share. With so many other factors affecting a carrier's share of the
originating market, these counter-intuitive relationships may only occur in the
short run, and therefore, forecasts based on these erroneous coefficients may be
invalid. As discussed in the final section of this chapter, a regression analysis
with these negative coefficients constrained to zero may be of more practical use
to airline management.
5. 3 Further Research
As shown in the last chapter, the structure of the non-linear regression
model given in Equation 4.3 is extremely useful because it allows one to include
further independent variables in a manner that still permits calibration by a
linear least squares method. Because Table 4.3 indicates that there is still more
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room for additional explanatory variables, further research in this area, using
this easily adaptable model, should attempt to define variables that could further
reduce the amount of unexplained variation in a carrier's market share
(especially in the hub cities). Using the step-wise regression technique,
additional variables can easily be added to the model and tested for significance.
The market share data (described in Chapter Three) used in this analysis
was defined as the percentage of tickets sold by travel agents for travel on
Northwest in a given market. Within a specific market, however, there exist
many different sizes of agencies, in terms of revenue generated, which could be
broken down into three or four different subgroups. By tabulating the market
share data as a function of agency size, and then performing a regression
analysis for each of these subgroups, the influence of an agency's size (or market
power) on a carrier's market share could be studied. If market share is found to
be a function of agency size, management could establish different baseline
market share goals as a function of this size.
Another known influence affecting the number of tickets sold on a
particular airline by a travel agency is the Computer Reservation System (CRS) to
which the agency subscribes. Due to the bias in these systems, travel agents may
be prone to make a reservation on the airline that serves as their host CRS. Thus,
travel agents using SABRE, owned by American Airlines, may be biased toward
American when selling a ticket to a consumer. Extending the analysis in this
thesis, the market share data presented in Chapter Three could be broken up into
two groups: those travel agents that subscribe to PARS (owned jointly by
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Northwest and TWA), and those agents that do not subscribe to PARS. A regression
analysis using both groups of market share data would reveal the effect of the CRS
host and would also allow for different market share quotas to be set for the two
groups.
Aside from the inclusion of additional variables in the model and
classifying the market share data in different ways, the effect of constraining
significant parameters, that were found to be negative, to zero should be studied.
Although it is clear that the constraint will increase the RMSE (if the parameter
was significant) and decrease the amount of explained variation in a carrier's
market share, the extent of these changes is unknown. Calibrating these market
share regression models with this additional constraint will produce, as discussed
in the last section, a more practical model, the results of which could be readily
used fur forecasting.
Finally, forecasts are only as good as the models used to produce them.
Comparing the results of a forecast with the outcome of that period should give an
indication of the model's validity. Also, as new data becomes available, the market
share model can be re-calibrated so that forecasts for the next period reflect the
carrier's most recent performance.
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